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Locked-in: don’t judge a book
by its cover
M Bruno,1 J L Bernheim,2 C Schnakers,1 S Laureys1
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS; also
called motor neuron disease) is a devastat-
ing medical condition that progressively
robs patients of their ability to move, speak
and eventually breathe. At present, many
physicians are hesitant to propose tra-
cheostomy and respiratory support in the
terminal phase of ALS. In accordance with
the principle of patient autonomy, physi-
cians should respect the right of the ALS
patient to accept or refuse any treatment,
including mechanical ventilation. Also, in
environments where euthanasia or physi-
cian-assisted death is legal, such requests
can be acceptable. At least two conditions
are necessary for full autonomy. To have a
claim on full autonomy, people need to
have intact cognitive abilities, and to
exercise this right they must be able to
communicate. In the past, the first condi-
tion was in doubt (indeed, overlap with
other neurodegenerative diseases is some-
times suspected and some patients with
ALS are thought to have associated fronto-
temporal dementia) and the second was
severely compromised in patients with
devastating motor impairment (communi-
cation being limited to the twitch of a
finger or the blink of an eye).
In this issue of J Neurol Neurosurg
Psychiatry, Lakerveld and colleagues1 inves-
tigated cognition in 11 patients with late
stage ALS (see page 25). They showed
preserved cognitive functioning (ie, lan-
guage, executive function, intelligence,
learning and long term memory) compared
with healthy controls. Assessments were
exclusively based on a ‘‘yes–no’’ response
mode. Because of the absence of verbal and
motor communication, the neuropsycholo-
gical assessment of these patients is com-
plicated, and adapted testing is needed. By
using a ‘‘yes–no’’ response mode based on
the remaining motor abilities of the patient,
this study proves the possibility of assessing
patients with minimal motor capacities.
The results show that patients with devas-
tating motor neurological impairment can
have preserved intact cognitive functioning.
The locked-in syndrome (LIS; most fre-
quently following a ventro-pontine stroke)
is another example of extreme motor
impairment. Indeed, patients with LIS are
classically tetraplegic and anarthric, but are
fully conscious and communicate their
thoughts and feelings via eye movements
or blinking. Several case reports have shown
good cognitive functioning in these patients
(for a review see Laureys and colleagues2).
Recently, Schnakers et al have confirmed
these results in a cohort of patients with
chronic LIS. The neuropsychological bat-
tery adapted to eye coded ‘‘yes–no’’
responses detected no deficits in patients
with an isolated brainstem lesion, but did
show cognitive impairments in patients
with additional supratentorial cortical
lesions.3 In the latter cases, detection of
cognitive deficits permitted adaptation of
the communication mode in order to fit the
preserved cognitive abilities and thus to
facilitate communication and to increase
the patient’s autonomy.
Contrary to LIS caused by an acute
brainstem lesion, ALS is a progressive neuro-
degenerative disease. This implies that, in
the later stages, patients with ALS will loose
all remaining motor ability to communicate.
In such a situation we currently have no
way to objectively assess these patients’
residual cognitive abilities, or even the
presence or absence of consciousness. A
solution could be the use of EEG based
brain–computer interfaces (also called
‘‘thought translation devices’’).4 Another
recently proposed possibility is communica-
tion via salivary pH. Indeed, mental imagery
of ‘‘milk’’ versus ‘‘lemon’’ is associated with
changes in the salivary pH, and the latter can
be used as a surrogate ‘‘yes–no’’ response
mode. This approach was shown to be
successful in a complete locked-in patient
with ALS (ie, total immobility includ-
ing ocular and palpebral movements).5
By validating adapted neuropsychological
testing and by demonstrating preserved
cognition in patients with devastating
motor neurological lesions, the study of
Lakerveld and colleagues1 has important
medical–ethical implications. It underscores
the right of these patients to autonomy and
demonstrates their ability to exercise it,
including taking end of life decisions. For
patients with no residual motor responses,
additional investigations will have to be
performed before this ultimate liberty can
also be extended to them. This demonstra-
tion in ALS of patients’ right to autonomy
and capability of exercising it will reduce the
ethical dilemmas of caregivers but not their
responsibilities. Huge challenges remain.
Firstly, it will be necessary for caregivers to
provide all of the information that is
necessary to validly exercise autonomy
and then to ask all relevant questions.
Moreover, they will have to phrase ques-
tions in such terms that they can unam-
biguously be answered by yes or no. The
latter is tantamount to making the complex
realm of existence, ideas, feelings and
volitions binary. Secondly, many additional
conditions need to be fulfilled for autonomy
to be full autonomy. Indeed, to quote
Harsanyi, ‘‘… we have to (…) distinguish
between a person’s manifest preferences
and his true preferences. […] A person’s true
preferences are the preferences he would
have if he had all the relevant factual
information, always reasoned with the
greatest possible care, and were in a state
of mind most conducive to rational
choice’’.6 The beauty of medical and com-
munication–technological progress for
patients with severe neurological conditions
is that it makes them more and more like
the rest of us. As a corollary, we caregivers
not only owe them the same respect in
terms of their autonomy as all other
patients, but we also have to rise to so far
seldom attained levels of clarity in matters
of life and death.
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